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 The innovations of the Civil War brought the United States and the world into the 
era of modern warfare. The invention of the gatling gun, torpedos, and even submarines played a 
role in deciding the victor in the American Civil War. Most often the Civil War is remembered 
because of its numerous battlefields with hundreds to thousands of soldiers lost. However, the 
Civil War was not only fought on the battlefield, but also in the bays and rivers. There was a race 
to gain superiority on the waters that surrounded the coastal cities. The Union had a head start on 
the Confederacy by having a greater number of ships and an organized navy to manage the fleet. 
The South had to create a navy that could defend its waters from the Union and continue to 
protect the trade of goods in and out of the South. The South was striving to build a navy that 
could compete with or overpower the Union’s navy. This could only be accomplished with the 
construction of armored ships capable of taking on multiple Union ships. These ironclad ships 
needed to have a formidable offense and be able to defend themselves. The South set this goal 
while in the midst of many other problems associated with war.1 
 The Union set up a blockade of the Southern coastline to stop the flow of goods in 
and out of the South. This strategy was very effective and slowed the Southern economy to a 
crawl. Although their economy was drained, the Confederate Navy continued to build and 
produce ironclad vessels to protect and defend what little was left of the South. 
 When taking a look at the broad story of the American Civil War, it is easy to 
forget that both the North and the South were fighting on the water. One of the struggles the 
Confederacy faced was an urgent need to build a navy. The majority of the South’s economic 
 
1 I would like to thank Dr. Lisa Clark-Diller for all the help in refining my paper down to a workable topic and for 




success up to that point was fueled from the sale of cotton through marine trade.2 This trade 
network needed protection from enemy ships and the coastal blockade. The South needed the 
navy to continue the rebellion to fund all fronts of the war by protecting their most precious 
resource - cotton, along with other natural resources- in order to continue funding the rebellion.  
The South was so far behind the North, however, in the size and strength of their navy that they 
needed superior ships to contest the North’s already established navy. This led to the South’s 
decision to build ironclad ships to float in their navy. Their vision of an ironclad navy was not 
without setbacks and failures, however. New Orleans was considered the perfect place to build 
the two largest Confederate ironclads, but their attempt to do so failed because of the economic 
instability of the South, which resulted in the value of these ironclads being underestimated.  
 This paper will look at the economic significance of the ironclad warships used by 
the Confederate Navy, as indicated by research compiled from the official records of the 
Confederate Navy along with letters and memoirs of the men involved in the construction of the 
ironclads. It is important to take note of the unintended consequences and successes that arose 
for the South from the decisions and actions of the naval department. 
The Birth of a Navy 
 At the start of the war the South lacked proper facilities to build up its navy. They 
did not have any shipyards large enough to build ships that were worthwhile to the war effort.3 
The assumption that Stephen Mallory, the secretary of the Confederate Navy, and other 
 
2 Raimondo Luraghi, A History of the Confederate Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 2 
20. 
Luraghi is also a leading scholar in the field of American naval history. He argues that the Union blockade 
was not the only aim of the Confederate Navy and that it was not a complete lost to the South. 
3 R. Thomas Campbell, Confederate Ironclads at War (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & 3 Company, Inc., 
Publishers, 2019), 1. 
  
 
Confederate leaders made was that they needed to purchase existing vessels to jump-start their 
navy.4 5 Mallory knew that this was only a short-term option in the first stages of the Confederate 
Navy. The Confederate Congress appointed $1,100,000 in 1861 so agents could purchase vessels 
and arms that could be used in the navy. Mallory sent agents to England, France, Canada, and 
even the North to find ships that were for sale and potentially beneficial to the war effort.6 The 
agents were sent out in secrecy to prevent news of their actions from being leaked to the Union.7 
Confederate leaders were not only hoping to purchase ships in foreign countries, but also to use 
shipyards in England to build these vessels as little emphasis had been put on shipbuilding in the 
South up until that time.8 
 Apparently, the Confederate agents had the monetary resources to supply a down 
payment on the ships as the South had begun to print their own money based on gold they had.9 
Mallory, however, needed the Confederate Congress to continue to fund his operations beyond 
the first initial payment. This would level the playing field on the seas as the North would have 
to expand their navy over more territory beyond the American shores to fight Confederate ships 
in English waters. However, Mallory knew that the Confederacy needed to start constructing 
 
4Luraghi, A History of the Confederate Navy, 32. 
5 Mallory was born in 1813 in Trinidad British West Indies, and he lived the majority of his life in Key  
West Florida. As he grew up in Key West, he began to find his life pulling him towards naval 
involvement. He volunteered as a naval commander in the Seminole War during the mid-1800s, giving 
him some experience in a navy. Mallory survived the war and became the judge of the Monroe County in 
Florida in which he served as a customs collector. 
6 Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Ser. 2, Vol.1, 790.  
(hereinafter cited as ORN) 
7 William N. Still Jr, “Confederate Naval Strategy: The Ironclad,” The Journal of Southern History 27, no. 
3 (1961): 331. 
8 Frank J. Meril, Great Britain and The Confederate Navy 1861-1865 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1970), 3.  
This one single action could have played a much greater role in the naval interactions between the North and the 
South as the Union had to deal with their own blockade of sorts from English ports. 
9 Emory Q. Hawk, Economic History of the South (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1934), 280. 
  
 
naval vessels within their borders to maintain the flow of trade goods and the defense of their 
coasts.10 
 Shipbuilding was of little importance to the majority of the Southern states before 
the Civil War and many of the ships used in the South were built in the North.11 The South 
focused on agricultural goods and the trade revolving around those goods, instead of dealing 
with final products. They had some product industries, but the majority of the Southern states 
were heavily invested in raw materials such as timber, cotton, iron, and coal.12 The South was 
fortunate enough to have these resources available, but they needed to be extracted and refined 
into workable materials. In spite of abundant resources, these resources were being used for other 
war-related efforts, and the South did not have the time to collect materials to start the 
construction of ships.  
 Mallory knew that the South could not fight the Union with the same kind of 
wooden ships that had been used for centuries past. He said: 
I regard the possession of an iron-armored ship as a matter of the first necessity. 
Such vessel at this time could traverse the entire coast of the United States, prevent 
all blockades, and encounter, with a fair prospect of success, their entire navy. If we 
cope with them upon the sea we follow their example and build wooden ships, we 
shall have to construct several at one time; for one or two ships would fall an easy 
prey to her comparatively numerous steam frigates. But inequality of numbers may 
be compensated by invulnerability; and thus not only does economy but naval 
success dictate the wisdom and expediency of fighting with iron against wood, 
without regard to first cost.13 
Because the Confederacy did not have industrial capabilities to compete with the Union, 
Confederate ships needed to be built with new fighting technology to even have a chance at 
 
10 ORN, Ser. 2, Vol.1, 752. 
11 Hawk, Economic History, 280. 
12 Luraghi, A History of the Confederate Navy, 37. 
13 ORN, Ser. 2, Vol.1, 742. 13 
  
 
success, and someone had to design and construct these ships. Mallory needed smart inventors 
and architects to achieve his ideas for a Confederate Navy. He called on the help of three men: 
John L. Porter, Lieutenant John M. Brooke, and William P. Williamson, who was appointed the 
Chief Navy Engineer at the beginning of the war. These men understood the importance of 
building up a navy to secure the ports of trade.14 Williamson said early in the war, “I did not 
think from the beginning of the War that the Confederacy could succeed if the Federal 
Government chose to prosecute the War. It was a new government against an old one… we had 
no navy to keep our ports open.”15 The navy was needed to protect the existing Confederate 
economy. These men were tasked with designing the machines that would accomplish that goal. 
 Porter drafted many of the first ironclad designs to be used as the main template for 
all of the ironclads.16 Brooke, on the other hand, was thinking about how the Confederacy could 
use what they already had. The U.S.S. Merrimack had been captured in Virginia at the Norfolk 
shipyard and was soon to become a Confederate ironclad. Mallory described Brooke’s task in a 
report given to the whole Confederate Naval Department in 1862: “I have the honor to report that 
on the 10th day of June, 1861, Lieutenant John M. Brooke, Confederate States Navy, was 
directed to aid the department in designing an ironclad war vessel, and framing the necessary 
specifications.” All three men would work on the Merrimack’s conversion planning, but 
according to Mallory’s letter, Brooke was spearheading the project.17 Both Brooke and 
 
14 Saxon T. Bisbee, Engines of Rebellion : Confederate Ironclads and Steam Engineering in the American 14 Civil 
War (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 2018), 42.  
There were other individuals involved, but these three men were the most important of the designers of the 
ironclads. 
15 Ibid., 43. 
16 Luraghi, A History of the Confederate Navy, 36. 
17 ORN, Vol. 2 Ser. 2, 174. 17 
Mallory wrote in this letter that Brooke was the one set in charge of the construction. This, however, is a 
controversial topic as Porter had been credited with the planning and designing of the ship. 
Look at “How the ‘Merrimack’ Was Built.” American Heritage 54, no. 6 (December 2003): 16. 
  
 
Williamson wanted to use the engines and shafts of the Merrimack because of the costs and time 
restraints to make new components.18 
 Williamson was the chief engineer of the ironclad program. He answered directly to 
Mallory.19 Williamson was involved in the design of the ironclads by making sure that the 
machinery inside the ship would have enough airflow and space to properly run. He did this by 
finding boilers and machinery that would fit into the burned remains of the Merrimack.20 He was 
concerned that the ironclad would not have enough power to maneuver through the water at a 
fast enough pace to avoid constant enemy gunfire. 
 Mallory asked the Confederacy to build ships that required parts to be machined 
and milled, which the South had little capability for producing. The Southern infrastructure 
transitioned from an agricultural society into one with factories and mills to create the needed 
parts for these iron-armored ships. The Confederacy would soon become the place where iron 
would float, but not without drastic changes to its infrastructure and economy.  
Reorientation of the Economy 
 The South’s economy was not originally built to produce war machines. The 
economy was built on a few foundational elements that originated with the first settlers and 
inhabitants of the area. As seen in the 1860 census, the South’s main economic venture was in 
agricultural business, including tobacco, cotton, and other raw natural goods.21 Of these “staple 
 
This article is short but gives a good overview of the issue of who created the plans for the most famous 
ironclad in Confederate history. All the men were involved in the planning process but some claim that credit 
was not distributed correctly. 
18 Virgil Carrington Jones, The Civil War at Sea (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), 157. 
19 Bisbee, Engines of Rebellion, 25. 
20 ORN, Vol. 2 Ser. 2, 175. 
21 Hawk, The Economic History, 385. 
  
 
crops” cotton was by far the largest, and distribution of cotton throughout the different avenues 
of trade was primarily on the waterways.22 
 The South had little interest in the industry and machinery that the North found so 
useful before and during the war. The profits from cotton were bountiful and kept the South 
entrenched in its production.23 However, as the war began, Southern leaders realized that they 
needed to build up their manufacturing and distribution infrastructure to match the Union’s 
ability to supply its army and navy. 
 Several factors prevented the South’s economy from growing as fast as the 
Confederates needed it too. First, was the Union’s blockade that kept goods from leaving and 
entering the South. The blockade started in Virginia and spanned all the way to the Texas 
coastline to ensure that the South could not receive foreign trade or aid.24 This took some time to 
achieve, but by 1861 the South felt the effects of the blockade, which had shut their trade down. 
 Jefferson Davis, the President of the Confederate States, was convinced that the 
demand for cotton would ensure help from European nations for the Southern cause.25 The 
Confederates considered their ability to set the price of cotton as a strategic maneuver that would 
require Europe to aid the Confederacy.26 This hope, however, was never realized. 
 As the Union continued to implement their blockade, the South’s ‘King Cotton’ 
economy deteriorated. The South could no longer rely on the trades with foreign nations to 
 
22 Ibid., 318. 
Before the Civil War, the people who colonized the Southern states built their towns and cities near rivers and 
bodies of water because it was easy for supplies and materials to be moved by ship. 
23 Luraghi, A History of the Confederate Navy, 19. 
24 J. Russell Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers (New York: Jack Brussel, 1959), 27. 
25 Francis M. Carroll, “Diplomats and the Civil War at Sea,” Canadian Review of American Studies 40, 25 no. 1 
(March 2010): 118. 
26 David G. Surdam, “The Confederate Naval Buildup,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 1 (2001): 118 
  
 
supply their needs for food, clothes, and luxury goods. The South needed to become self-
sufficient in its agriculture and economy.27 Confederates were still trying to figure out how to 
keep trade open to England and other nations, since the market for cotton in Britain was huge.28 
The navy department knew that having ironclad ships would help alleviate some of the blockade 
pressure put on merchants trying to move goods to Europe. 
 The primary naval goal was to protect the national maritime trade— if there were 
no cotton exports, there would be no incoming money, which meant there would be no new ships 
to help protect the economy.29 But the funds for these ships were not yet available, and more 
cotton needed to be sold. James D. Bulloch, a Confederate commander who was sent to England 
to figure out arrangements to build or purchase ironclads, wrote in 1862 from Liverpool a letter 
to Mallory explaining his troubles with the Confederacy’s monetary issues: 
I think the sum necessary to complete the three ironclad ships might be realized by the 
sale of cotton; but the requirements of the home Government, through its various officers 
and agents in Europe, are for a very large amount of money, and people seem afraid to 
risk their money upon so uncertain a speculation as buying an article shut up by a 
blockading fleet and subject to the casualties of war. The cotton certificates given out by 
Mr. Mason for Sinclair's ship do not appear to have been a sale, strictly speaking, because 
no money has been paid, and the contractors will always have the ship as a security for 
the money expended. Our necessities require cash to be actually paid in hand, for the 
certificates of cotton ownership on the other side of the Atlantic, and I am very fearful 
that we can not realize the amount we desire, because of the wants of others which must 
be provided for at the same time.30 
Bulloch described to Mallory how the English were fearful of using the promise of cotton sales 
as payment for the ironclad ships. They feared that the Union blockade would restrict the amount 
 
27 Lerner, Money, Prices, 20. 
28 Jesse A. Heitz, “British Reaction to American Civil War Ironclads,” Vulcan: Journal of the Social 28 History of 
Military Technology 1 (February 2013): 57. Britain consumed about half the world’s raw cotton in 1860 for their 
textile industry. 
29 Luraghi, History of Confederate Navy, 20 
30 ORN, Ser. 2, Vol. 2, 312. 
  
 
of cotton exported from the Confederacy and were uncertain that they would get any cotton at 
all.  
 Many sailors risked their ships, cargo, and their lives to keep trade flowing; these 
sailor merchants were known as blockade runners. The blockade runners showed that it was 
possible to keep trade open during the war amidst the Union’s blockade. The Confederacy’s idea 
was that if they could keep the flow of trade open and continue to export raw cotton to Europe, 
the effectiveness of the Union blockade would be diminished. This would demonstrate to the 
Europeans that the blockade was not a serious issue.31 Blockade runners, however, did not risk 
their lives or their ships at an affordable price. Many blockade runners would charge extreme 
amounts for their services.32 Since Mallory could not rely on blockade runners, he needed 
ironclad warships to break through the blockade. Because there was no efficient way to get the 
crops out of the South, the price of cotton in the South dropped significantly.33 
 The second factor that limited the Southern economy was the South’s lack of useful 
industry; it was difficult for their factories to produce goods that were formerly imported into the 
South.34 Mallory knew this and went forward with the decision to build ships within the 
Confederate states.35 Construction was viable with the raw materials present in the South, but 
there was a lack of skilled labor and capable facilities suited for the project. The economy and 
infrastructure were not established for this type of construction.36 
 
31 Surdam, “The Confederate Naval Buildup,” 119. 
32 Surdam, “The Union Navy’s Blockade Reconsidered,” Naval War College Review 51, no. 4 32 
(1998): 100. 
33 Lerner, Money, Prices, 27. 
34 Ibid., 28. 34 
35 Still, Iron Afloat, 228 
36 Fletcher Pratt, Civil War on Western Waters (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956), 39. 
  
 
 The third factor was that, the South also had problems revolving around currency 
and funding projects. During the Civil War each Southern state started printing their own 
currency to fund the projects they needed.37 The main reason states printed their own money was 
to purchase supplies, but the states also raised taxes and sold bonds to help fund their projects.38 
The simple act of printing more money when the state needed it caused prices to inflate and the 
real value of wages to drop considerably. The Confederate Congress passed an act in March 
1863 to help alleviate all the excess bills created by the states by passing a special tax for the 
collection of these old bills.39 This compulsory act of funding was in line with the South’s main 
concern around establishing a central form of currency. The treasury department had been 
working on this since the beginning of the war, but this was a minor issue for many Southern 
citizens; life in the South had become hard and unbearable.40 This, however, did not stop the 
Confederate government from collecting taxes in many different ways. 
 Taxation became typical for Southern families. The Confederate government 
established a new war tax of 50 cents for every $100 of property whether it be land, slaves, 
merchandise, bank stocks, or even fine goods like gold and pianos.41 This tax excluded families 
who had less than $500 of the total property. There were other taxes on top of the war tax, such 
as an additional 8 cent land tax per acre and even a tiered profession tax. The Southern people 
were not only feeling the pressure of being at war in their physical locations, but they were also 
feeling it in their wallets as well.42 Because the South was not in a position to build and produce 
 
37 Hawk, Economic History, 417. 
38 Lerner, Money, Prices, 20. 
39 Hawk, Economic History, 408. 
40 Ibid., 407. 
41 Ibid., 410. 
42 Ibid., 411. 
  
 
war vessels capable of defending its economy, it was extremely difficult for the naval department 
to build a navy. The Confederate government had to resort to writing loans and issuing new taxes 
to keep up with the demands of production for the war effort and to build the navy that Mallory 
needed.43 Mallory said in 1862:  
The United States have a constructed Navy; we have a Navy to construct, and as we can 
not hope to compete with them in the number of their ships—the results of threequarters 
of a century— wisdom and policy require us to build our ships in reference to those of 
the enemy, and that we should, in their construction, compensate by their offensive and 
defensive power for the inequality of numbers.44  
The knowledge that the Union had a viable navy was a clear reminder to the South that they only 
had a short time to get an ironclad ship into the water to defend their shores from the Union.  
 This was first accomplished through the conversion of old ships into new ironclad 
vessels.45 The Enoch Train, a tugboat along with other boats were purchased for $100,000, and 
the conversion process began.46 The first fully constructed ironclad was the C.S.S. Manassas, 
which was a conversion build. These ships were cut and modified heavily to prepare them for 
their new life as an ironclad. Many different parts and pieces were needed to make the ironclads 
effective in battle. Iron was used for the armor plating and rams which made the ironclad unique, 




43 Ibid., 402. 
44 ORN, Ser. 2, Vol. 2, 151. 44 Mallory said this particular statement in 1862, but he held this view before 1862. He 
wrote a letter in 1861 to C.M. Conrad, the chairman of the Naval Committee of the Confederate States, saying that 
the Confederacy needed to construct a navy made up of iron armored ships that could hold against the many Union 
ships. 
45 Still, Facilities, 290. 
46 Campbell, Confederate Ironclads at War, 5. 
  
 
Transportation and Raw Materials 
 The use of roads and waterways in the South has always been at the center of its 
economic growth and movement. Towns and cities were built near rivers and bodies of water so 
that watercraft could serve as a main mode of transportation. This was because it was easy to 
travel and trade using the rivers to move goods, especially since there were so few railroads built 
in the South before the war.47 As the South’s economy and infrastructure grew, protecting the 
rivers was a primary goal for the Confederate Navy. Water transit was still the most cost 
effective and fastest way to move tons of materials like iron or timber. Mallory knew that the 
larger ships could not enter the shallow rivers and maneuver properly, but he wanted the 
ironclads to be able to patrol the rivers to protect the trade and movement of resources from mills 
and factories. 
 One of the many issues the South faced in the construction of ironclads was getting 
the raw materials they needed to build the ships. Many of the rebelling states had an abundance 
of natural resources such as timber, iron deposits, and other metals they could use for building 
ships or arms, but these resources were often still in their raw form and unusable at the beginning 
of the Civil War.48 There were a few facilities that could produce iron thick enough for the armor 
on the ironclads. These facilities were located in Atlanta and Richmond, which meant that the 
iron plates had to be transported to the shipyards. Other facilities, located in Tennessee and 
Virginia, could manufacture marine machinery like engines and shafts that were needed to propel 
 
47 Hawk, Economic History, 318. 47  
Without protection from the navy, movement of raw materials and goods were limited to locomotives. Trains in the 
South were a relatively new thing, only first being established in the 1830s. Many of these railroad lines were short 
and had different gauged tracks, which meant that the materials had to be transferred to another train to continue 
further. However, by 1860, over $325 million had been spent on building railroads. 
48 Still, Facilities, 294. 
  
 
the ships.49 Building these vessels required a vast amount of iron and machinery, which were 
typically located long distances from the job-sites and needed to be transported to the shipyards 
by rail. Transportation logistics played a huge role in the production of ironclads for the 
Confederacy.50 Not only were the resources a long way away, these raw materials were of no use 
in the final production of the ship unless they were refined first.51 The lack of iron refineries 
slowed the production of the ironclads significantly, and the ships were left defenseless without 
the iron-plated armor. By the spring of 1862, four out of five ships that were constructed in the 
Confederacy were ironclad vessels.52 The ships required iron, the machinery required iron, and 
the transportation system required iron to build more railroads; iron was the bottleneck that 
slowed the navy’s shipbuilding program to a crawl.53 
 Iron was not the only critical component needed to build an ironclad; milled lumber 
was also an essential resource that the South had to gather.54 Before the war the South had over 
six hundred million acres of forest, which the Confederacy tapped into for their growing 
economy and shipbuilding program.55 The majority of these forests were live oak, which is one 
of the best trees to use for shipbuilding. However, lumber from these oak trees needed to be 
seasoned for a few years to be used in shipbuilding.56 A non-native species of yellow pine trees 
were introduced in the South to speed up the process of curing timber for shipbuilding. These 
 
49 Ibid., 287. 
50 Still, Facilities, 291. 
51 Still, Iron Afloat, 228. 
52 Still, Facilities, 294. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 280. 
55 Ibid., 20. 
56 Hawk, Economic History, 278. 
  
 
pine trees were known as “green timber,” which was used in ships when there was not enough 
time to cure the oak timber, as was the case with the ironclads constructed in New Orleans.57 
Ironclad Construction in New Orleans 
 As the South continued to expand its small but growing navy through taxation and 
other monetary means, Confederate leaders understood that there was a desperate need for an 
ironclad that could stand up to the majority of the Union’s navy. The construction of these 
armored vessels took a substantial amount of time, money, labor, and commitment, all of which 
were in short supply during the first few years of the Confederacy’s life.58 Money was 
particularly difficult for Mallory to get in a timely manner. The naval department had to apply 
for funds to pay their workers through the treasury department, which at times took forty days to 
be fulfilled. Mallory felt limited by the treasury department and he made that clear in a letter to 
the department: “An army disbursing agent at New Orleans has been furnished with a large 
amount in small treasury notes, $100,000, as is there stated, while none is supplied to this 
department. This greatly embarrasses most of them, and inconveniences arising from it are daily 
brought to my notice.”59 The inability of the naval department to pay its workers was causing 
issues for the laborers there. Mallory was frustrated that the army disbursing agent could receive 
funds when the naval department could not.  
 
57 Still, Confederate Shipbuilding, 59. 
This kind of timber worked fine for the first few years of a ship’s life, but would start to warp after a few years. This 
warping was very damaging to the ship’s hull. 
58 ORN, Ser. 2, Vol. 2, 151. 58 
59 ORN, Ser. 2, Vol. 1, 733. 




 The navy department knew that they had to take advantage of the private sector of 
shipbuilding, which had already been established before the war with the construction of small 
steamships and river craft.60 The process of building military ships had not been explored by the 
South before the war, and there were few shipyards capable of producing more than just small 
steamships.61 Contracts were signed for ironclads to be constructed in private shipyards. These 
shipyards were under direct control of naval agents. Most contractors had to follow the already 
designed plans for the ironclads (although the “contractors” of the Mississippi did not).62 Many 
of these designs were drawn up by different naval engineers working for the naval department, 
but John M. Brooke was known for designing some of the first ironclads.63 Since the navy was 
so heavily involved with the construction of each ironclad, agents were sent to all the different 
shipyards to make sure contractors were following the designs. The agents were not there to help 
the shipbuilders build or obtain the needed materials to finish construction; they were there to 
make sure that the contractors were meeting the deadlines set by the navy. 
 The Confederacy decided to build ships in New Orleans to protect the Mississippi 
River and the states neighboring it.64 The dry docks in New Orleans were some of the biggest in 
the South (next to the one in Norfolk, Virginia) which made New Orleans a perfect place to work 
on the super weapon: ironclads. It was far enough away from the potential invasion of Union 
troops and was near a main avenue of trade for the Confederacy, the Mississippi River.65 Mallory 
 
60 Still, Iron Afloat, 9. 
61 Still, Facilities, 286 
62 Luraghi, A History of the Confederate Navy, 35. 62 
More detail on this information can be found on page 18 and 19 of this paper. 
63 George M. Brooke Jr., John M. Brooke: Naval Scientist and Educator, (Charlottesville: University Press 63 
of Virginia, 1980), 253. 
64 Joseph Thomas Durkin, Stephen R. Mallory (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 64 
1954), 155. 
65 Still, Iron Afloat, 42,43. 
  
 
knew that both 66 characteristics of New Orleans would be beneficial to the completion of their 
much needed ironclads as he and the Confederate Congress approved the construction of five 
ironclad ships. The Confederacy would have a group of gunships if they acted quickly before the 
Union blockade was set. New Orleans, however, had never built any military vessels in its docks 
before the Civil War, this meant new methods of naval construction had to be set up. The process 
of changing the dry docks to accommodate the construction of ironclads took time and money.66  
In September the department determined to build ironclad vessels in the Confederate 
States, and on the 9th of that month requested the President to authorize the transfer of 
the amount of that appropriation, $2,000,000, to another appropriation under act of 
Congress No. 124, May 14, 1861, which was done, and the construction of a large 
ironclad gunboat commenced in New Orleans under the supervision of … Tift, [and] 
agents of the department. Three hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars have been 
expended up to this time. This vessel will be finished, it is hoped, in about forty days, and 
the cost will not exceed $800,000. These gentlemen have also commenced the 
construction of two smaller ironclad vessels; they will cost about $150,000 each.67 
The naval department was planning for the construction of the ironclads in New Orleans to last 
about forty days, but that estimate was significantly shorter than reality. One major reason 
construction took longer than expected was due to the unavailability of the resources needed in 
the unstable Confederate economy.68 Finding skilled workers also became a task that took more 
time than expected.69 Mallory was complaining that the flow of money to build these ships was 
too slow to fulfill the needs of the Confederacy and that more money would be needed.70 The 
lack of resources, labor, and money pushed back the completion date, but Mallory continued to 
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put his faith into the ironclads. This would make or break the Confederacy’s ability to compete 
in the war.71 
 One of the main ironclads under construction in New Orleans was the C.S.S 
Mississippi; this ironclad was built under the supervision of the Tift brothers. The Mississippi 
was designed by the Tifts and was 206 feet long and 58 feet wide with a draft of 15 feet. This 
design made the Mississippi the largest ship ever to be built at that time. The ship would weigh 
in at over 1400 tons and the materials were estimated to cost almost $400,000. It was estimated 
that the Mississippi would be capable of reaching 14 knots.72 This ironclad was to be a 
formidable force for guarding the Mississippi River, which was crucial to the Confederacy 
because many supplies from Texas and other areas west of the river would be cut off if access to 
the river was lost.73 
 Building the Mississippi was not a simple task for the Tift brothers— neither one of 
them had any experience building ships before. Mallory sent the brothers a letter with seven 
procedures they were to follow as, “agents of the naval department.”74 The brothers’ designs 
were looked over by Brooke and Porter with a few minor changes to the original plans.75 
Construction on the Mississippi started late in September of 1861 after all the plans had been 
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worked out by both the Tifts and the naval department. The Tifts had no official contract limiting 
their ability to impose their own financial limits and this allowed them to pay whatever was 
needed to get the materials and labor to finish the Mississippi.76 Tift said that the naval agents 
never supplied them with any of the materials or labor.77 The agents were there solely to make 
sure that proper procedures were being followed. All the bills and workers were paid on time; 
according to a Tift interview during the investigation by the naval department in 1863. “On our 
arrival in New Orleans, my brother and myself determined to pay [the men] every Saturday 
night, and continued to do so for several weeks…”78 The Tifts were very attentive to their 
workers. There was a high demand to get these vessels completed and ready to defend the 
harbors for the support of other Confederate agencies. Mallory sent a telegram to the Tifts 
stating, “Work night and day to get your ship done without regard to expense, strain every nerve 
to finish ship. Expend money to encourage mechanics if essential to speed up completion.”79 The 
Confederacy needed this ironclad in the water so it could defend the city against the pressing 
Union fleet. The ship was launched early because of the rising water levels in the dock. The 
thought was that the work could be finished while the ship floated in place.80 The ship was never 
finished because the city of New Orleans was taken by the Union in April 1862. The last 
shipment of iron arrived just twenty-four hours before the city fell.81  
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 However, the Mississippi was not the only ironclad meant to defend New Orleans.82 
The other major ironclad constructed in New Orleans was the C.S.S Louisiana. The Louisiana 
was estimated to cost $196,000, and the price would go up $98 every day it was finished early 
and drop $98 for every day it was finished late.83 E.C. Murray was in charge of seeing the 
Louisiana finished and in working order. The work on the Louisiana started in October 1861, 
right around the same time as the Mississippi. “The Louisiana was 264 feet long and had a 62 
foot beam [width]. The Louisiana had a heavy shield and house in her… [and] the Louisiana had 
about 1,700,000 feet of lumber.”84 This ironclad weighed 1400 tons and it had 84 four engines to 
power it. It was also armed with sixteen guns.85 Murray had similar issues as the Tifts in 
procuring supplies and skilled laborers to continue work. Work on the Louisiana halted for two 
weeks because there was a shortage of iron due to a misunderstanding of who was receiving the 
iron that arrived for the Louisiana. Murray said in an interview with the naval department in 
1863, that he could have finished the Louisiana in less than six weeks, but that the lack of 
resources and pressure from the blockade made that impossible.86  
Labor Issues 
 Because the construction of ironclads was new to the workers and people around 
the construction areas, the public had conflicting sentiments towards the usefulness of these 
vessels in the navy. The partial victory from the shores of Hampton Roads of the ironclad 
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Virginia taking on the Union blockade helped boost the morale of the people towards ironclads.87 
Some southerners wanted to see more iron floating down the rivers as it meant that their shores 
were being protected. Not everyone, however, saw the navy as being something to invest in. 
General George E. Pickett said that no one should be reassigned to go work on any of the navy’s 
ships because it was a waste of manpower.88 These men were needed in other positions in the 
army, which also required laborers. 
 Another serious issue faces by the Navy was the lack of labor within its ranks. 
There was a huge shortage of skilled laborers who could complete the tasks involving mechanics 
and more technical jobs.89 Before the war, there were over 4500 mechanics and 500 ship 
carpenters who were skilled laborers.90 But with the inscription and drafting in the army, many 
of these skilled workers were sent to the battlefields to carry a gun instead of a hammer. Mallory 
said in a letter in 1862, “All efforts at construction, whether by contractors or by the department, 
have been crippled by the want of mechanics…Every applicant willing and able to work upon 
our vessels has been employed and at wages nearly double those given 12 months ago.”91 The 
whole department was feeling the pain of having no one available to work, along with the 
financial burden of keeping the workers satisfied with their wages. 
 This was the case with the construction of the two ironclads in New Orleans. 
Construction of the Mississippi and the Louisiana were delayed due to labor disputes for 
wages.92 These labor troubles were based on the lack of money and available materials to work 
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with.93 Both main contractors of the Mississippi and the Louisiana said that their men went on 
strike. Tift did his best to remedy the situation as he saw fit.  
There was a strike there of all the men in all the shipyards in and about New Orleans. The 
first intimation I had of the strike was, in making my usual visit to the yard, I found that 
all the men knocked off except the 20 from Richmond. I went immediately to Algiers and 
sought out the principal men in this organization.94 
Tift knew that the men had to stay on task if they were to finish by the contract date.95 The main 
reason for the strike was that the men felt they were underpaid. By the end of the strike week, 
most of the city of New Orleans was tired of the workers’ strike. The people wanted these 
vessels built.96 Tift did his best to quickly settle the wage issue by giving the workers $5 a day 
instead of the $4 they were receiving before. He was worried that the strike would drastically 
affect the navy’s ability to produce the ironclads.97 Time was of the essence. After the strike, the 
brothers forced the men to start working on Sundays and during the nights to make up for the 
time.98 But having a steady stream of work to do was rare; there were times when they had a lot 
of work to do, then sometimes there was a lull in production due to an integral part of machinery 
still being in transit to the shipyard.99  
Conclusion 
 The Confederate ironclad building program was seen as a failure because it never 
built a ship that was capable of breaking the Union blockade. The fact that the two largest 
ironclads in New Orleans were destroyed before they could defend the city makes it easy to see 
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that their construction at face value was not worth their effort. But this failure was caused by the 
harsh economy the Confederacy was dealing with, not the inability of the ironclads to perform 
the tasks they were being built to do. Both the Union and the Confederacy said that the 
Mississippi would have been capable of defending the New Orleans port by itself.100 Mallory 
said in 1867 that he believed the Mississippi, if completed, could have lifted the entire 
blockade.101 The Mississippi never got the opportunity to prove its worth because of the delays 
and problems that arose during construction. The loss of the Mississippi and the Louisiana did 
not stop Mallory or the naval department. In fact, Mallory continued to build ironclads and said, 
“…This is a heavy blow, but it serves but to nerve our people to greater resistance. Surrender or 
concession are not thought of, but on the contrary we are, if possible, more than ever resolved to 
conquer and maintain our independence.”102 Mallory took this loss not as a complete failure, but 
as an opportunity to improve his department’s chances of completing ironclads in other 
locations. He hoped to revolutionize naval warfare by showing what could be done despite 
limited resources.103 
 The Mississippi or the Louisiana would have been formidable opponents for any 
Union vessel. The incredible feats of Mallory and the naval department to organize and build a 
navy that had not existed was a taste of success for the Confederate States. Although the 
Confederate Navy got an occasional victory, it still felt the burden of losing precious materials 
and labor due to the advancing Union armies. Mallory and his men knew that because of the fall 
of New Orleans they would have to work even harder to accomplish their goal of naval 
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superiority, and ironclad construction in the South looked bleaker as the Union armies marched 
closer to the South’s precious shipyards. 
 Nevertheless, the efforts of Mallory and his staff were not a total loss. Their ability 
to establish a new sector of the economy in the South was a victory that many historians have 
overlooked. The construction of facilities that could produce the needed materials and the 
maintenance system of labor they created can been seen as a victory as well. Moving towards 
industrialization, during a time when the South was fighting to preserve the agricultural economy 
they had years before, helped them to become the New South. It opened up new labor 
opportunities for many Southerners and brought in new skilled trades and workers to the South. 
Even though the ships these men were building did not accomplish their intended goals, the 
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